通信,拉近世界的距离!
您的位置:首页 >资讯 >业界新闻 >查看资讯

从“默认真实”到“默认造假”:深度伪造如何颠覆视觉信任体系

移动通信网 程然

一段由伊朗新闻机构发布的视频显示,一枚疑似美国制造的"战斧"巡航导弹击中一所学校,据称造成超过 175 人死亡,其中多数为儿童。在生成式 AI 与深度伪造技术泛滥的当下,这段视频的真实性遭到全球性怀疑。一位从事数字媒体取证研究近三十年的学者最终通过逐帧物理分析确认视频为真——但这一过程本身,恰恰揭示了视觉信任体系正在发生的根本性坍塌:我们对影像的默认态度,已经从"推定真实"转向了"推定造假"。

一场周六早晨的取证马拉松

这位学者的第一反应与普通怀疑者并无二致:视频画质低劣、在轰炸发生数周后才流出、且仅由一家记录欠佳的新闻机构分发。但由于事件的潜在影响,他还是投入了整整一个周六的上午进行分析。他首先假设,如果导弹是后期逐帧合成且未考虑相机运动,其轨迹将出现物理上的不合理。他以画面中静止的背景地标为参照对齐各帧,结果导弹的运动轨迹呈现近乎完美的线性——这符合真实飞行的物理特征。

第二步是尺寸核验。在合理假设之下,视频中的导弹对应一枚约 6 米长的"战斧"导弹,拍摄距离约 100 米。这一距离与场景相符,也与撞击画面和撞击声之间 0.3 秒的延迟吻合——按声速 343 米/秒计算,声源距离恰好落在 100 米量级。多个独立维度的物理证据相互印证,最终促使他向记者确认视频真实。

【关键数据】

- 取证研究年限: 约 30 年的数字媒体鉴伪经验(从"推定真实"到"推定造假"的态度转折)

- 导弹尺寸估算: 约 6 米长"战斧"导弹

- 拍摄距离推算: 约 100 米,与 0.3 秒音画延迟吻合

- 声速参照: 343 米/秒

- 报道伤亡数字: 超 175 人,多为儿童

鉴伪者的心理困境:没有造假痕迹不等于真实

这次分析对他而言是一个转折点。此前他与加州大学伯克利分校同事合作的研究显示,公众对视频的怀疑已经泛化到难以被真实内容说服的程度——即便没有任何造假痕迹,观察者也无法轻易说服自己"这是真的"。他意识到自己也陷入了同样的心理:举证责任已经从质疑者一方,转移到内容创作者一方。这种"推定造假"的立场对正当创作者看似不公,却如实反映了当前的媒介生态,也指向了一个必须依靠技术重建信任的未来。

内容溯源:C2PA 凭证与传感器级签名

人工取证无法以互联网的速度和规模运行,内容溯源信号则可以。其一是符合 C2PA 标准的内容凭证:在拍摄瞬间,设备将加密签名的清单附加到照片或视频上,记录设备型号、时间、位置及后续所有编辑操作,任何篡改都可被机器检测。其二是水印方案,如谷歌 SynthID,在像素或音频样本中嵌入不可感知的来源标识。

苹果则将这一思路推进到硬件层面。在其部分最新 iPhone 上,相机传感器在采集原始像素数据时即进行加密签名,签名数据随后生成一张参考图像,与常规可编辑照片并排保存。任何人都可以比对二者,精确看出哪些内容被修改过。这种从传感器源头建立信任链的做法,将验证环节从"事后鉴伪"前移到了"生成即签名"。

信任重建的行业路径

内容溯源信号常被批评为不完整的方案,且存在被攻击的可能——如果将其视为抓捕造假者的机制,这种批评确实成立。但从行业演进方向看,其真正价值在于为绝大多数正当内容提供低成本的可验证性,将鉴伪资源集中到少数可疑内容上。随着 C2PA 获得主流设备厂商、芯片平台与媒体机构的广泛采纳,"拍摄即签名、传播可验证"有望成为影像领域的默认基础设施。

从长期看,视觉记录的信任危机不会靠单一技术解决,而是取决于取证分析、加密凭证、硬件签名与平台治理的协同成熟。当溯源信号的覆盖率达到足够规模,普通用户验证一段影像真实性的成本将大幅低于伪造者绕过验证的成本——到那时,"推定造假"的防御性姿态才有可能重新让位于健康的怀疑精神。


出处:I Don’t Trust Visual Recordings Anymore. But One Day I Will Again

英文原文
In March of this year, a flurry of emails and text messages from a half dozen reporters around the world disrupted my quiet Saturday morning. An Iranian news agency had aired a week-old video of what appeared to be a U.S.-made Tomahawk missile hitting a school. News reports claimed that the strike killed more than 175 people, most of them children. The U.S. president and military denied responsibility. In the age of generative AI and all things deepfake, everyone—including me—was skeptical of the video’s authenticity. I get this type of request a lot. For the past three decades, I’ve been developing mathematical and computational techniques to analyze and detect manipulation in digital media. Over this time, I think it’s fair to say that I, like most people, have approached visual recordings with a “presumption of authenticity”: If a skeptic claims that a recording is fake, the burden of proof is on them. In today’s world of generative AI, however, I think we need to shift this stance to a “presumption of fake.” That is, the burden is now on the creator to prove that their content is real. While this new stance may seem unfair to legitimate creators, I think it both reflects reality and points to a future where we will once again be able to trust that most online media is what it appears to be. The forensic approach to deepfake detection Even last March, I was already tilting toward a presumption of fake. My initial response to the reporters was something along the lines of, “I am suspicious of the video because the quality is low, it emerged weeks after the bombing, and it is only being distributed by an Iranian news agency with a less than stellar record of accurate reporting.” Given the potential implications if the video was indeed real, however, I resigned myself to spending my Saturday morning analyzing it. I first reasoned that if the Tomahawk missile was digitally added to each frame of the video without taking into consideration the camera motion, we might see a physically implausible missile path. So I aligned the video frames using a stationary background landmark as a reference. In the updated video, the missile did, in fact, move in a nearly linear trajectory. (See the yellow dots in the composite shown below.) I next asked if the size (in pixels) of the missile in the video was plausible. Under some reasonable assumptions, I estimated that the missile in the video corresponded to a 6-meter Tomahawk at a distance of approximately 100 meters. The distance seemed plausible from the scene and was also consistent with the delay of 0.3 seconds from visible impact to the sound of impact, given that sound travels at 343 meters per second. Composite photo composed of frames from a video of the Tomahawk strike reveal’s the missile’s trajectory. Hany Farid; Source: Mehr News Despite the mounting evidence, though, I struggled to refine my answer for the reporters. My skepticism was fueled by a recent study I worked on with colleagues at the University of California, Berkeley, that showed how hard it is to distinguish real from fake videos. Observers are now so suspicious of videos in general that they have trouble convincing themselves that a video is real. But after a few more hours and a few more analyses with the missile video, I finally decided that it was authentic, and I gave the reporters my updated view. This analysis marked a turning point for me. I realized I was just like the participants in our study: The lack of artifacts was not enough to readily convince me a video is real. I had flipped from a presumption of real to a presumption of fake. Signaling a video’s provenance When the visual record is no longer reliable, what can we do? The types of forensic analyses that I routinely perform do not currently operate at internet scale and speed. But provenance signals can. These signals include content credentials and watermarks that are inserted or embedded at the time of creation or recording. Credentials that follow the C2PA standard, for example, attach a cryptographically signed manifest to a photo or video at the moment of capture; this metadata records the device, the time and location of the recording, and any subsequent edits. Because the manifest is signed, any tampering with either the content or its history can be detected later by machine. Watermarks, like Google’s SynthID , embed an imperceptible signal directly into the pixels or audio samples that identifies the content’s origin. Apple recently took these ideas a step further . On some of its newest iPhones, the camera sensor can cryptographically sign the raw pixel data as it’s captured. That signed data is then developed into a reference image saved alongside the normal, editable photo. Anyone can then compare the two and see exactly what, if anything, was changed. These provenance signals are often criticized as being only a partial solution or vulnerable to attack. This is true if we think of them as mechanisms for catching bad
微信扫描分享本文到朋友圈
扫码关注5G通信官方公众号,免费领取以下5G精品资料
5G通信公众号
  • 1、回复“YD5GAI”免费领取《中国移动:5G网络AI应用典型场景技术解决方案白皮书》
  • 2、回复“5G6G”免费领取《5G_6G毫米波测试技术白皮书-2022_03-21》
  • 3、回复“YD6G”免费领取《中国移动:6G至简无线接入网白皮书》
  • 4、回复“LTBPS”免费领取《《中国联通5G终端白皮书》》
  • 5、回复“ZGDX”免费领取《中国电信5GNTN技术白皮书》
  • 6、回复“TXSB”免费领取《通信设备安装工程施工工艺图解》
  • 7、回复“YDSL”免费领取《中国移动算力并网白皮书》
  • 8、回复“5GX3”免费领取《R1623501-g605G的系统架构1》
  • 本周热点本月热点
    通信人才网

    最热通信招聘

    更多